Social Indeterminacy and Relativism

In my current research, I argue that the social world—the world of social groups, institutions, and kinds—​is indeterminate and perspectival.

The social world is indeterminate in the sense that: there is no fact about whether certain individuals are members of certain social kinds. For example, due to the vagueness of racial kinds, there are individuals, many of whom identify as mixed race, who are neither Black nor non-Black. By understanding the indeterminacy of racial and other social kinds, we can better capture the experiences and social structures that surround mixed race, non-binary, and bisexual people.

The social world is perspectival in the sense that: whether you have a social property is relative to the perspective of those attributing the existence of social properties. My relativist theory of social kinds is unique because (a) it implies that we talk about the same social kinds even though they are perspective-dependent and (b) it does not imply that all perspectives are equally legitimate.

Drafts

• "Social Construction and Indeterminacy"
  • An increasing number of philosophers argue that indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) in the sense that indeterminacy has its source in the world itself (rather than how the world is represented or known). The standard arguments for metaphysical indeterminacy are centered around the sorites paradox. In this essay, I present a novel argument for metaphysical indeterminacy. I argue that metaphysical indeterminacy follows from the existence of constitutive social construction; there is indeterminacy in the social world because there is indeterminacy in how the social world is constructed.
• "Ontological Erasure"
  • In recent social metaphysics, philosophers have described forms of injustice that hold partly in virtue of metaphysical considerations: ontological oppression, ontological injustice, categorical injustice, and so on. The goal of this paper is to introduce another form of metaphysical injustice: ontological erasure. Ontological erasure occurs when an individual is wronged in virtue of it being indeterminate whether they are a member of a socially constructed group. My primary example of erasure concerns gendered groups that do not account for the possibility of trans people. In such cases, it is not that trans identity is considered and rejected; rather, the category of trans identity is ignored entirely.
• "Gender Relativism"
  • How can a theory of gender terms both be descriptively adequate (faithful to ordinary usage) and politically adequate (useful for feminist political projects)? Relativism, that's how.
• "Derivative Indeterminacy"
  •  Indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) if it has its source in the way the world is (rather than how it is represented or known). Suppose metaphysical indeterminacy exists. Is indeterminacy derivative, fundamental, or somehow neither? My goal is not to decide this question but to clear the ground for an answer. I clarify what it means for metaphysical indeterminacy to be derivative by using the framework of metaphysical grounding. Then I argue that accepting the existence of derivative indeterminacy is not nearly as metaphysically committal as philosophers have traditionally assumed.

Grounding Pluralism

Publications

My current research is an application, in many ways, of my previous work on metaphysical grounding.

Dependence is said in many ways.

• Donating to charity is right because it promotes happiness.
• It’s true that people exist or unicorns exist because it’s true that people exist.
• The ball is colored in virtue of being red.

Many philosophers take these claims to be underwritten by kind of dependence (or explanation) called metaphysical grounding.

I defend grounding pluralism, the view that there are multiple kinds of grounding. I posit three kinds: why-grounding (which tells us why things are the case), how-grounding (which tells us how things are the case), and what-grounding (which tells us what it is for something to be the case). 

• ​"Varieties," Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, 2020.
  • Grounding pluralism tells us that there are varieties of grounding. But there are also varieties of grounding pluralism! In this article, I survey the different ways in which one might be a pluralist about grounding.
• ​"On What (in General) Grounds What", Metaphysics, 2020.
  • ​Consider a generic grounding claim like: an act is right in virtue of maximizing happiness. Traditionally, this claim is understood as simply quantifying over relationships of ground. Against this view, I argue that generic grounding claims are almost always claims of real definition.
• "Grounding is Necessary and Contingent", Inquiry, 2019.
  • It is common to think that grounding is necessary in the sense that: if P grounds Q, then necessarily: if P, then Q. Though most accept this principle, some give counterexamples to it. Instead of straightforwardly arguing for, or against, necessity, I explain the sense in which grounding is necessary and contingent. I argue that there are two kinds of grounding: what-grounding and why-grounding, where the former kind is necessary while the latter is contingent. 
• "Grounding Pluralism: Why and How", Erkenntnis, 2018.
  • Grounding pluralism is the view that there are multiple kinds of grounding. In this essay, I motivate and defend an explanation-theoretic view of grounding pluralism. Specifically, I argue that there are two kinds of grounding: why-grounding—which tells us why things are the case—and how-grounding—which tells us how things are the case.​