Grounding Pluralism
Dependence is said in many ways.
I defend grounding pluralism, the view that there are multiple kinds of grounding. I posit three kinds: why-grounding (which tells us why things are the case), how-grounding (which tells us how things are the case), and what-grounding (which tells us what it is for something to be the case).
- Donating to charity is right because it promotes happiness.
- It’s true that people exist or unicorns exist because it’s true that people exist.
- The ball is colored in virtue of being red.
I defend grounding pluralism, the view that there are multiple kinds of grounding. I posit three kinds: why-grounding (which tells us why things are the case), how-grounding (which tells us how things are the case), and what-grounding (which tells us what it is for something to be the case).
Publications
- "Varieties," Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, Forthcoming.
- Grounding pluralism tells us that there are varieties of grounding. But there are also varieties of grounding pluralism! In this article, I survey the different ways in which one might be a pluralist about grounding.
- "Grounding is Necessary and Contingent", Inquiry, 2019.
- It is common to think that grounding is necessary in the sense that: if P grounds Q, then necessarily: if P, then Q. Though most accept this principle, some give counterexamples to it. Instead of straightforwardly arguing for, or against, necessity, I explain the sense in which grounding is necessary and contingent. I argue that there are two kinds of grounding: what-grounding and why-grounding, where the former kind is necessary while the latter is contingent.
- "Grounding Pluralism: Why and How", Erkenntnis, 2018.
- Grounding pluralism is the view that there are multiple kinds of grounding. In this essay, I motivate and defend an explanation-theoretic view of grounding pluralism. Specifically, I argue that there are two kinds of grounding: why-grounding—which tells us why things are the case—and how-grounding—which tells us how things are the case.
Drafts
- "Real Anti-Essentialism"
- I sketch a novel theory of gender anti-essentialism. It makes two claims: (a) genders lack essences because they are metaphysically indeterminate, and (b) genders are nonetheless stable because the possess stable metaphysical grounds.
- "Grounding and Linguistic Semantics"
- I give an account of how the notion of metaphysical grounding can help articulate and clarify debates in the foundations of semantics. Specifically, grounding has a role to play in the foundations of (a) lexical semantics, (b) compositional semantics, and (c) semantic modeling.
- "On What (in General) Grounds What"
- Consider a generic grounding claim like: an act is right in virtue of maximizing happiness. Traditionally, this claim is understood as simply quantifying over relationships of ground. Against this view, I argue that generic grounding claims are almost always claims of real definition.
- Consider a generic grounding claim like: an act is right in virtue of maximizing happiness. Traditionally, this claim is understood as simply quantifying over relationships of ground. Against this view, I argue that generic grounding claims are almost always claims of real definition.
Applications of Grounding
I am currently applying the notion(s) of grounding to linguistic semantics and social metaphysics.
- Within linguistic semantics, there are two kinds of questions you might have about meaning. First: what is the meaning of X? Second: what grounds the meaning of X? Philosophers and linguists tend to (a) mix up these questions and (b) take the first question as primary. I want to clarify the second question and explore the resulting implications for linguistic meaning.
- Within social metaphysics, it is common to emphasize the contingency of social objects and categories (like genders, races, etc) while at the same time recognizing their reality. For example, gender anti-essentialists believe there is no such thing as what it is to be a woman, but they often believe that women exist, and that gender properties are not metaphysically fundamental. I argue that grounding can help articulate views like gender anti-essentialism.
For drafts/questions, please contact me at kevinrichardsonphd (at) gmail (dot) com.